Tricksy Voting and Watchful Voters

I have a few fans or gadflies from my role as a precinct warden in Boston. A few discuss elections and voting procedures when we meet on the sidewalk, supermarket, Y or elsewhere in Hyde Park or even Dedham.

One in particular is determined to stump me on ways a vote or the whole precinct can be gamed. He's pulled up in his car beside me when I hike up and down the hills (Brush and Fairmount) as well as in those other places. He walked to my side yard today while I was weeding my raised beds for the winter.

His wife too has asked pointed questions at the check-in table or nabbing me on her way out after pushing her ballot into the scanner. They want to make damned sure things are right and incorruptible.

He and his wife were already wired with questions about early-voting ballots. They noted that the envelopes carry the name and address of the voter on the outside of the ballot container. Isn't my ballot secret? How can I be sure you don't know how I voted.

This one I had to give him. Among the many what-if questions, I suppose that a warden or clerk could examine a given absentee or early ballot and see the contents. At the risk of sounding like a pol saying, "Trust me," I note:

• We take state and federal oaths not to observe a voter's choices.
• When a voter calls us for assistance while voting, we always involve at least a second elections official to avoid any appearance of influencing choices.
• When the scanner rejects a ballot, we do not look at the ballot unless the voter asks us to examine it to determine the problem. Instead, we look at the LCD screen on the scanner to see the message (typically OVERVOTED BALLOT or BLANK BALLOT). Too many choices for an office or no choices at all are reasons for rejection. The voter then can fix it (maybe with a replacement and spoiled ballot set) or we can override it by pressing a scanner button to tell it to take the ballot anyway.
• We batch process the early and absentee ballots, turning them so we can't see the choices, merging the ballots and feeding them into the scanner separated from any envelope that might let us see who was voting.
• Finally and practically, we get so many (300-ish early and absentee) in the recent election, that we don't have the time or interest in any one ballot. That's the trust-me aspect, but the oath and our modus operandi are more meaningful.

Hypotheticals

Today for example, while I had both hands filthy with soil and weeds, he wanted to know the likes of whether someone could sneak into the polling place after it closed and alter the results. I explained how the scanner works, including:

• All ballots are scanned and their data written to the memory card.
• At poll closing, with the police officer, 5 inspectors, clerk, warden, and generally several observers from campaigns in the adjacent lobby awaiting the scanner printout, the warden turns off the scanner.
• This freezes the memory card and no longer allows scanner input.
• After the clerk fills out the spreadsheets accounting for each ballot received, used, spoiled, cast as provisional, and provided as write-in or early voting, all ballots go into the locked box that the police officer ferries to Elections in City Hall. (That's 255 precincts at the end of each Boston election).
• It addition, the police officer carries the actual scanner with its frozen memory card and its attached printout of all the results.
• There's a pouch (Envelope A in vote lingo) that includes the only key to the scanner, any provisional ballots, affirmations of residence from those who had to provide ID (mostly voters listed as Inactive). and such goodies as updated voter registration forms.
• Finally, the officer has to bring the sealed ballot box that includes every ballot received in any form and cast in any form. These go into a vault in City Hall for at least 10 days (in the event of a recount), a vault that must be opened simultaneously under supervision of Elections with one Democratic and one Republican official, using their vault key at the same time.

Yes, this certainly is an anal-retentive system. Yes, unlike some states, we do use paper ballots for the trail provided. Yes, every ballot is sacred. We don't even let a voter tear up a spoiled ballot.

Of course, I'm boringly scrupulous and I'm prejudiced because of this position, I don't see how it would be worthwhile to try to game this system.

As for the secrecy of the ballot, a.k.a. the American (and Australian) Way, I am aware many people are deeply emotionally involved. I know the shameful early history where elections officials and party pols could see how people voted (as in which clear voting container they used for their ballots). Those were days of retribution and wrong, wrong, wrong.

Yet for me, I'm happy to tell anyone how I voted and wouldn't mind anyone seeing my ballot before or after I cast it. My wife is the opposite. I thoroughly respect her attitude, and likewise that of probably a vast majority of my precinct's voters. I don't look at anyone's ballot unless they ask me to. I don't ask how they voted or why.

I do admit though that I appreciate the gadflies who ask me their what-if questions. If they can stump me, I'll happily bother Elections with any perceived problem.