Engineer at local chip company didn't just ship forbidden drone tech to Iran, he got his company to help Iranians develop a system to test more drone parts, feds charge

An engineer who worked at Analog Devices was arrested today on charges of violating US export laws, helping provide technology to what the US considers a foreign terrorist organization - a wing of the Iranian military known as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Mahdi Mohammad Sadeghi, 42, who lives in Natick and who has both Iranian and US citizenship, faces up to 20 years in prison if convicted on a charge of conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economics Powers Act, which bans the sale of sophisticated technology to Iran.

An Iranian executive, Mohammad Abedini, arrested in Italy today, who allegedly set up a company in Switzerland to help Sadeghi evade US export restrictions, faces up to life in prison on charges that also include providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization resulting in death - for the Iranian drones for which his company provided guidance systems that killed three American service members in an attack on a Jordanian listening post in January.

According to the US Attorney's office in Boston:

As alleged in court documents, Abedini, Sadeghi, and others conspired to evade U.S. export control and sanctions laws by procuring U.S. origin goods, services, and technology from, among others, U.S. Company 1 and causing those goods, services, and technology to be exported or otherwise supplied to Iran and, in particular, Abedini’s Iranian company, SDRA.

Analog Devices, formerly in Norwood, now based in Wilmington, builds a series of products that can be used to pilot drones to targets. Sadeghi started working there in 2019, after getting a PhD in electrical engineering at the University of Michigan, where he led two projects to develop "3D inertial sensors and flow sensors" used in the navigation of micro-air vehicles, or very small drones, according to his LinkedIn page.

According to an affidavit by an FBI agent on the case, Abedini began trying to procure US technology for drones in 2014 - and quickly realized that while companies would not ship anything to him in Tehran, he could get deliveries with no problems in Switzerland - where he did post-doctoral work and from where he would hop on a plane to Iran.

Between in or about January 2016 to January 2018, ABEDINI used U.S.-based electronics distributors to order electronic components from multiple U.S.-based manufacturers, including U.S. Company 1, for delivery in Switzerland, often to ABEDINI’s university address. At least certain of these parts included microcontrollers that are used in the Sepehr Navigation System [which controls Iran's Shahed drones].

Sadeghi, the affidavit alleges, began working with Abedni in 2016 to procure American technology, including from Analog Devices.

Not long after Analog Devices hired him as a microelectromechanical systems engineer, the affidavit continues, Sadeghi began talking up Abedini's Swiss company as a possible partner on testing of new microchips and systems.

After SADEGHI introduced ABEDINI and Illumove [Abedinis Swiss front company] to U.S. Company 1 [Analog Devices\, U.S. Company 1 Employee emailed ABEDINI about a potential collaboration between Illumove and U.S. Company 1 for Illumove to develop the hardware and software for an evaluation tool that could be used for a wide range of U.S. Company 1 inertial sensors. U.S. Company 1 Employee copied SADEGHI on the email to ABEDINI. ABEDINI returned a signed NDA to U.S. Company 1 on or about September 2, 2019. The NDA stated that the proprietary information that would be shared pursuant to the NDA was subject to U.S. export laws and that each party agreed to follow all applicable export laws and regulations.

Soon thereafter, on or about September 10, 2019, on behalf of Illumove, ABEDINI ordered multiple electronic components, which were subject to export controls, through a U.S. distributor and listed the shipping address as a lab at the Swiss University. According to the datasheets for those parts, the electronic components had aerospace applications. On or about September 11, 2019, SADEGHI sent ABEDINI U.S. Company 1 proprietary information relating to the requirements for a potential project.

ABEDINI left Switzerland and returned to Iran approximately one week later, on or about September 17, 2019. Based on my training and experience and the results of this investigation, including the facts set forth herein, I believe that ABEDINI took the U.S. technology, which had not been publicly released, and the U.S.-origin electronic components with him to Iran, in violation of U.S. export control and sanctions laws.

The project was to develop a Windows-based monitoring system for evaluating how Analog Devices components - including sensors of the type used in Iranian drone guidance systems - would work with customers' existing software. The two companies finally signed a contract in 2021 - even Iranian drone work slowed due to Covid-19.

One the project was underway, however, the two principals had a problem: How to conceal the fact that the Iranians working on the project were actually in Iran, rather than Switzerland when they participated in phone calls or video discussions with Analog employees in Massachusetts?

financial records kept by ABEDINI indicate that, on multiple occasions, ABEDINI purchased Virtual Private Network ("VPN") services for Illumove and categorized the purchases as for the "[U.S. Company 1] Project." VPNs create a secure connection between a user's device and a remote server, which masks a user's IP address and location. Based on my training and experience, I know that VPN services are often used in criminal enterprises to obfuscate the location of a user's device, and I have reason to believe that SDRA [the Iranian company Illumove was a front for] employees, including ABEDINI, were utilizing VPN services to mask their location while working on the U.S. Company 1 project in Iran.

The work also caused some tension at Abedini's Iranian company, at least with one employee, who objected to getting paid in American dollars when he was actually in Iran.

The affidavit continues:

On at least fourteen occasions between in or about March 2022 and April 2024, U.S. Company 1 also shared U.S. Company 1 technology, including datasheets for U.S. Company 1 electronic components—many of which had not yet been released to the public—with ABEDINI while ABEDINI is believed to have been in Iran. For example, on or about December 21, 2023, an employee at U.S. Company 1 emailed ABEDINI's Illumove email account and attached five datasheets for U.S. Company 1 electronic components, three of which were marked as "Confidential." One of those components, which has navigational and direction-finding capabilities, is listed as ECCN 7A994 and is regulated by the Department of Commerce under the “Antiterrorism” designation. At the time U.S. Company 1 sent ABEDINI the five datasheets, travel records indicate that ABEDINI was located in Iran. ...

Throughout the course of the project with U.S. Company 1, ABEDINI also used Illumove to transfer U.S.-origin goods to Iran—goods that he could not have shipped directly to Iran due to U.S. export controls and sanctions laws. Since in or about May 2022, U.S. Company 1 has made at least ten direct shipments of U.S. Company 1 electronic components to ABEDINI at the registered address for Illumove in Switzerland—which is an address at the Swiss university. The shipments from U.S. Company 1 have included integrated circuits, sensors, and evaluation boards for multiple U.S. Company 1 parts. For example, U.S. Company 1 shipped accelerometers, gyroscopes, and inertial measurement units, certain of which have navigation and UAV applications.

And so, the affidavit concludes:

On January 28, 2024, shortly after 5:00 a.m. local time, three U.S. servicemembers were killed and more than 40 others were injured when a drone, later identified as a Shahed-101P One-Way Unmanned Aerial System, struck living quarters at a U.S. military outpost in Jordan (Tower 22).

The drone that struck the Tower 22 site and resulted in the death of the U.S. servicemembers was recovered and was analyzed by the FBI's Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center ("TEDAC").

Among other things, TEDAC was able to extract data from the microcontroller found on the drone that struck Tower 22. The data extraction reflected that the navigation system used in the drone: (i) was manufactured by [Abedini's Iranian company]; (ii) the device was listed as "SPHR"; and (iii) the navigation system operated using the Sepehr v.1.43.023 firmware. Based on TEDAC's analysis, as well as other evidence in this case, there is probable cause to believe that the drone that struck the Tower 22 site and resulted in the death of U.S. servicemembers utilized the same Sepehr Navigation System that SDRA routinely sold and continues to sell to the IRGC [Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps] Aerospace Force, which ... is the strategic missile, air, and space force within the IRGC that also serves as the primary operator of Iran's fleet of UAVs.

Innocent, etc.